My Dear Friend,
thank you for your comments.
But railway crossings in Europe are controlled by the same staff, who was responsible for 2 high-speed train crashes in Spain in 2026.
Please read the transcript (from X):
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Closing the circle further on the Urda accident.
At 8:30 a.m., a computer failure knocked out the LZB, the system that monitors train speeds on the Madrid-Sevilla line.
Six trains stopped on their own.
Up to that point, everything worked as it should.
What came next fits into seventeen minutes.
8:36. Adif’s control center in Atocha orders to resume travel “normally.”
Without LZB, the protocol demands the opposite: proceed by sight, 40 km/h maximum, and eyes on the track.
The order wasn’t just for the AVE.
Other trains received the same mistaken instruction, and one of their drivers corrected the controller: no, by sight.
The error went unnoticed.
Simply put, it wasn’t corrected for everyone.
8:41. The Iryo contacts the control center and receives the same instruction: resume normally.
8:48. The Iryo driver calls again. The train won’t let her restart the system. It’s stopped.
Meanwhile, the AVE is advancing at over 180 km/h on average in the minute before impact.
8:53. The AVE rear-ends the Iryo at the entrance to Urda station.
Sixty-four dead up to this moment.
It’s what’s hardest to understand.
On the controller’s screen, the Iryo appeared stopped.
The AVE was approaching it at a speed the protocol didn’t allow.
There were seventeen minutes between the order and the crash, and at least one warning five minutes earlier that the train ahead couldn’t move.
And not a single braking order.
Nothing makes sense.
Or maybe it does, and that’s what’s worrying.
An isolated error is just that—isolated.
But this error repeated with several trains, one driver spotted it and corrected it, and yet everything continued for seventeen minutes with all the information on screen and five minutes before the collision the struck train says it’s stopped.
That’s no longer a slip-up.
It’s a system where no one, or nothing, had the capacity to understand what was about to happen and stop it in time.
That’s the question the investigation will have to answer.
Not who messed up at 8:36—that seems clear—but why no one could correct it at 8:50.
A buzz, a siren, something in the control room.
I am a small fish, so I develop
Pre-voice warning in car navigation:
You are approaching railway crossing
Status: High risk
Railway officers rejected installation of GPS tracking in trains by default
Railway officers rejected installation of a monitor in a train to let a driver to watch live image from camera/s installed over the railway crossing
Railway officers don’t install inductive loop under the railway crossing to detect a car as an obstacle
Railway officers showed no interest in installing a countdown timer before the railroad crossing to inform drivers how long until a train arrives, from which direction, and at what speed
I am a small fish and must live with the thought, that when I cross a dangerous railroad crossing, I’m always risking my life